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Abstract 
 
The jurisdiction or competence of the Equality Court to hear a 
dispute concerning alleged hate speech is affected by various 
jurisdictional factors. The decision in South African Human 
Rights Commission v Khumalo 2019 1 All SA 254 (GJ) reveals 
several shortcomings in the provisions regulating jurisdiction in 
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 which must be attended to in order 
to provide clarity and legitimacy in regard to the application of 
the protection against hate speech. 
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1 Introduction 
Jurisdiction means the competence of a court, forum or tribunal to entertain 
a case between parties. Two questions come into play: First, does the court 
or forum has the power to hear the case? Secondly, can the court determine 
the particular issue that arises?1  
Several factors can restrict the jurisdiction of the court: the subject matter, 
the amount being claimed or monetary restrictions applicable to the court or 
forum, the territory over which the court may preside, the parties and other 
criteria.2 In general, the geographical jurisdiction of a court is determined 
with reference to the person (the defendant) or the cause of the action. 
Courts as creatures of statute may entertain what matters are permitted in 
terms of the enabling legislation.3 
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000 (the PEPUDA) confers legal standing in respect of hate speech cases4 
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1  Graaff-Reinet Municipality v Van Ryneveld's Pass Irrigation Board 1950 2 SA 420 
(A) 424; Spendiff v Kolektor (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 537 (A) 551. 
2  Graaff-Reinet Municipality v Van Ryneveld's Pass Irrigation Board 1950 2 SA 420 
(A) 424 et seq. 
3  Harms Civil Procedure in Magistrates' Courts; Harms Civil Procedure in Magistrates' 
Courts D26.3 Inherent Jurisdiction.  
4  The discussion here is restricted to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA). However, it should be noted that 
Parliament is considering adopting the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes 
and Hate Speech Bill (the Hate Crimes Bill). The second version of the Hate Crimes 
Bill was published in March 2018 (DoJ 2018 
https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/hcbill/B9-2018-HateCrimesBill.pdf and see the 
Explanatory Summary published in Gen N 167 in GG 41543 of 29 March 2018), but 
it has since lapsed, and must be reintroduced for consideration. A further version of 
the Hate Crimes Bill would also have to take cognisance of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal judgment that has since been handed down in Qwelane v South African 
Human Rights Commission 2020 2 SA 124 (SCA) (Qwelane). The main purpose of 
the Hate Crimes Bill, contrary to the civil remedies offered by the PEPUDA, is to 
criminalise acts recognised as hate crimes and as hate speech. Its enactment, to a 
limited extent, would regulate certain aspects concerning hate speech, but not the 
civil remedies referred to in this contribution. For more information pertaining to hate 
crimes see Botha 2019 SALJ. Also see Burchell 2019 Acta Juridica. The author 
investigates the current remedies: the civil law actio iniuriarum, the remedies for 
crimen iniuria, approaching the South African Human Rights Commission and the 
Equality Court in terms of equality legislation. He questions whether a need exists 
for the introduction of a new criminal statute devised to punish hate speech. 
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to a variety of persons. Unfortunately, no time bar exists for the institution 
of a claim in terms of the PEPUDA.5 These aspects, therefore, increase the 
risk that multiple cases by multiple complainants may be instituted in 
different Equality Courts having concurrent jurisdiction or that several 
complainants may lodge separate complaints for the same matter.6  
The purpose of this contribution is to consider what the Equality Court in 
South African Human Rights Commission v Khumalo7 (Khumalo) refers to 
as "the procedural evolution of the matter before the court".8 Against the 
backdrop of the judgment, the following issues concerning the jurisdiction of 
the Equality Court are interrogated:  
(a) the territorial and monetary jurisdiction of the Equality Court; 
(b) whether the cause of action must necessarily resort in the Republic of 
South Africa for the Equality Court or the South African Human Rights 
Commission (the SAHRC) to have jurisdiction; 
(c) the requirements for appeals and reviews in the Equality Court; 
(d) whether the Equality Court has jurisdiction over hate speech 
perpetrated in the workplace or in the execution of duties; and 
(e) different complainants referring complaints and the potential open-
endedness of a hate speech case. 
First, the salient facts in Khumalo are outlined briefly. Thereafter, the legal 
question that was considered by the Johannesburg High Court sitting as the 
Equality Court is set out. This is followed by a brief description of the 
arguments raised, the court's reasoning for its findings, and a discussion of 
the issues listed in (a) to (e) above. 
In the discussion, several pending hate speech cases are referred to. The 
facts of these cases and their outcomes are often times very controversial. 
Unfortunately, hate speech cases despite their wide media publicity are 
                                            
5  Although the Equality Court in South African Human Rights Commission v Khumalo 
2019 1 SA 289 (GJ) para 60 held that it may be inferred that the ordinary prescription 
rules apply. 
6  Refer to South African Human Rights Commission v Khumalo 2019 1 SA 289 (GJ) 
para 60 as an example. 
7  South African Human Rights Commission v Khumalo 2019 1 All SA 254 (GJ) 
(Khumalo). 
8   Khumalo paras 4-25. 
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rarely reported.9 Khumalo, which was reported, provides valuable insight 
into some of the discrepancies that may arise in hate speech cases in 
practice. It is not our objective here to discuss the definition of "hate speech" 
or when speech would constitute hate speech in terms of the PEPUDA.10 
Rather, we focus on the several jurisdictional and procedural issues that are 
revealed in Khumalo. 
It is important to have clarity on the issue of which court or forum has 
jurisdiction to entertain a matter to save legal costs and to ensure the 
expeditious resolution of disputes. This would promote the right to access 
to justice as envisaged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (the Constitution) and the aim of the PEPUDA to resolve disputes 
expeditiously.11 It is concluded that legislative amendment is required to 
address uncertainties and the technical difficulties arising in the application 
of the PEPUDA. Suggestions for reform are proffered. 
2  The facts 
On 4 January 2016 Khumalo, a state official who at the time worked as a 
Sports Officer for the Gauteng Provincial Government, on a social media 
platform posted the following utterance while participating in an online 
debate: 
I want to cleans [sic] this country of all white people. we must act as Hitler did 
to the Jews. I don't believe any more that the [sic] is a large number of not so 
racist white people. I'm starting to be skeptical [sic] even of those within out 
[sic] Movement of the ANC. I will from today unfriend all white people I have 
as friends from today u must be put under the same blanket as any other racist 
white because secretly u all are a bunch of racist f*** heads as we have 
already seen.  
A while later12 he continued: 
Noo [sic] seriously though u [sic] oppressed us when u [sic] were a minority 
and then manje u call us monkeys and we suppose to let it slide. white people 
in south Africa deserve to be hacked and killed like Jews. U have the same 
                                            
9  In this case note too, media statements are referred to. We acknowledge that media 
reports may be misleading, one-sided or exaggerated.  
10  In this regard, see the pivotal decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Qwelane 
(fn 4). This needs to be read in conjunction with s 10 of the PEPUDA. Also see the 
brief discussion in fn 16 and 127 below.  
11  Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution); reg 10 in GN R764 in GG 25065 of 13 June 2003 proposes a simple 
procedure to expedite the resolution of disputes in the Equality Court. 
12  Khumalo para 30. He had posted the first utterance at 05h39. He posted the second 
utterance after he saw another monkey insult at 11h00. 
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venom moss. look at Palestine. noo u [sic] must be bushed alive and skinned 
and your off springs used as garden fertiliser.13 
An initial complaint had been lodged by the current ruling governing political 
party, the African National Congress (the ANC) on behalf of its white 
members.14 The complaint only referred to the first statement that was 
posted by Khumalo as cited above. This case was referred to the 
Roodepoort Magistrates' Court acting as the Equality Court. The complaint 
was framed as one of unfair discrimination on the ground of race, as 
envisaged in section 7(a) of the PEPUDA.15 When it was discovered that 
the complaint actually concerned hate speech and not unfair discrimination, 
a Notice of withdrawal was filed, but the case was apparently reinstated, 
absent any formal procedures, when Khumalo subsequently was 
summoned to appear on charges of alleged hate speech in terms of section 
10 of the PEPUDA.16 
                                            
13  Khumalo para 1. 
14  Khumalo para 16. As the ground to establish its locus standi the ANC relied on the 
fact that Khumalo had in his statement referred in particular to its white members.  
15  Khumalo para 14. Section 7(a) of the PEPUDA reads: "no person may unfairly 
discriminate against any person on the ground of race, including – (a) the 
dissemination of any propaganda or idea, which propounds the racial superiority or 
inferiority of any person, including incitement to, or participation in any form of 
violence." 
16  Khumalo para 18. Section 10(1) of the PEPUDA defines "hate speech" as referred 
to in this contribution. When judgment was handed down in Khumalo, s 10 of the 
PEPUDA was still unaffected by the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal judgment in Qwelane on 29 November 2019. Section 10(1) as it was before 
the amendment pursuant to Qwelane read as follows: "[s]ubject to the proviso in 
section 12, no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate words 
based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could 
reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to- (a) be hurtful; (b) be 
harmful or to incite harm; (c) promote or propagate hatred". However, s 10 must now 
be read in conjunction with Qwelane, in which the Supreme Court of Appeal declared 
s 10 of the PEPUDA inconsistent with s 16 of the Constitution (the right to freedom 
of expression). Section 10 of the PEPUDA was therefore declared unconstitutional 
and invalid. Parliament has been granted 18 months from 29 November 2019 to 
remedy the defect. The Supreme Court of Appeal as an interim measure amended 
the wording of s 10 to read as follows: "No person may advocate hatred that is based 
on race, ethnicity, gender, religion or sexual orientation and that constitutes 
incitement to cause harm. 10(2) Without prejudice to any remedies of a civil nature 
under this Act, the court may, in accordance with section 21(2)(n) and where 
appropriate, refer any case dealing with the advocacy of hatred that is based on 
race, ethnicity, gender, religion or sexual orientation, and that constitutes incitement 
to cause harm, as contemplated in subsection (1), to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions having jurisdiction for the institution of criminal proceedings in terms of 
the common law or relevant legislation." Also see fn 127 below. In our view, 
Khumalo's utterances would constitute "hate speech" under the interim definition 
also. 
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In the Roodepoort proceedings Khumalo had represented himself.17 
Ultimately a settlement was reached between the ANC and Khumalo, in 
which Khumalo admitted to being guilty of contravening both sections 7 and 
10 of the PEPUDA.18 In terms of the settlement agreement Khumalo 
apologised for making the utterance, paid R30 000 to a charity organisation 
and presented three hour-long talks at schools.19  
Unaware of this first referral, the SAHRC lodged a second complaint against 
Khumalo in the Johannesburg High Court sitting as the Equality Court, this 
time in terms of the hate speech provision as contained in section 10 of the 
PEPUDA.20 Both the cited utterances were placed under scrutiny this time 
around. The SAHRC, acting on behalf of white South Africans in general 
and on behalf of victims of the holocaust and their descendants resident in 
the Republic21 argued that Khumalo's utterance incited genocide and 
propagated hatred against White South Africans.22 Moreover, Khumalo's 
utterance could be viewed as anti-Semitic as reference was made to Hitler 
and the Jews during the holocaust.23 But before the assessment of the 
utterance could proceed, the Johannesburg Equality Court had several 
jurisdictional hurdles to traverse. These questions in law are discussed in 
more detail below. 
3 The legal question 
The Johannesburg Equality Court (per Sutherland J) in Khumalo considered 
whether a second referral should be heard if two sets of proceedings had 
been instituted in two divisions of the Equality Court ostensibly on the same 
subject matter.24 The court was required to consider upon proper 
interpretation of the PEPUDA in line with its purpose and in the light of the 
values of the Constitution, whether it should hear the second dispute.25 The 
question was whether it would be "lawful and proper" for a complaint in 
terms of section 10 of the PEPUDA to be heard by the Equality Court despite 
the fact that another complainant had complained about the same utterance 
in previous proceedings.26 
                                            
17  Khumalo para 21. 
18  Khumalo para 22. 
19  Khumalo para 22. 
20  Khumalo para 6. 
21  Khumalo para 63. 
22  Khumalo para 4. 
23  Khumalo para 4. 
24  Khumalo para 49. 
25  Khumalo para 7. 
26  Khumalo para 3.1. 
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4 The decision 
In making the determination of whether instituting the second round of 
proceedings constituted an abuse of the court process27 Sutherland J 
considered three legal doctrines: autrefoit acquit or double jeopardy, res 
judicata and issue estoppel.28  
The court made short shrift of the argument that double jeopardy applies. It 
was held that autrefoit aquit does not apply to hearings conducted under the 
PEPUDA, because its application is restricted to the realm of criminal 
procedure only.29  
As to the potential applicability of res judicata and issue estoppel, the court 
noted that for res judicata to be established three circumstances must 
prevail: the same issue must be aired, between the same parties and the 
same relief must be sought.30 However, it was not the same complainants 
in the Khumalo-case.31  
As to whether the nature of the two referrals in Khumalo were the same, the 
judge noted that slight differences existed. The first referral had been 
brought in terms of section 732 and section 1033 of the PEPUDA.34 The 
second had been referred in terms of section 10 only. However, both 
allegations were based on exactly the same utterance. Sutherland J held 
that for the ANC to have framed the initial complaint as one under section 7 
of the PEPUDA was not the correct course of action.35 He indicated that a 
complaint in terms of section 7 for unfair discrimination on the grounds of 
race is not the same as a complaint of hate speech.36 The ANC ought to 
have referred the dispute under section 10 of the PEPUDA as the complaint 
more closely resembled one based on hate speech.37  
The court explained that issue estoppel meant relaxing the strict rules of res 
judicata in certain instances where on the facts it would serve the interests 
                                            
27  Khumalo para 50. 
28  Khumalo para 3. 
29  Khumalo paras 51-53. 
30  Khumalo para 54. 
31  Khumalo para 54. 
32  Which regulates unfair discrimination. 
33  The hate speech provision. 
34  Khumalo para 7. 
35  Khumalo para 17. 
36  Khumalo para 17. 
37  Khumalo para 17. 
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of justice to do so.38 With reference to Prinsloo v Goldex 15 (Pty) Ltd39 the 
court highlighted the three requirements to establish the common law rule 
of res judicata, and indicated that the same requirements apply in respect 
of issue estoppel.40 However, under issue estoppel the courts have 
acknowledged that strict adherence to the requirement that the respective 
disputes must be the same and that the same relief was sought would defeat 
the very purpose of res judicata, which was to "prevent the repetition of 
lawsuits between the same parties, the harassment of a defendant by a 
multiplicity of actions and the possibility of conflicting decisions by different 
courts on the same issue."41 Issue estoppel allows the court to dismiss a 
case where the same relief is sought by the same parties if a final decision 
had been taken on the issue in previous litigation.42 
The court held with reference to case law in point that a strict application of 
the res judicata rule presents practical problems for complainants.43 In Carl 
Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd it was held:44  
Suppose the first case is one of trifling importance but it involves for one party 
proof of facts which would be expensive and troublesome; and that party can 
see the possibility that the same point may arise if his opponent later raises a 
much more important claim. What is he to do? The second case may never 
be brought. Must he go to great trouble and expense to forestall a possible 
plea of issue estoppel if the second case is brought?45 
The court held that whether issue estoppel can be applied is dependent on 
the particular facts of the matter and must be decided on a case-by-case 
basis. The court must be mindful not to relax the res judicata principles if it 
could have unfair consequences for subsequent referrals.46  
In support of the proposition that issue estoppel should be applied, the 
Amicus Curiae in Khumalo, the Legal Resources Centre (the Amicus), relied 
upon the decision in Royal Sechaba Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Coote,47 in which 
the court held48 that, if the facts present, the "same parties" requirement 
should in principle be capable of relaxation or adaptation. The court has a 
duty to develop the common law if the interests of justice so require, and 
                                            
38  Khumalo para 54. 
39  Prinsloo v Goldex 15 (Pty) Ltd 2015 5 SA 297 (SCA) (Prinsloo v Goldex). 
40  Khumalo para 55. 
41  Khumalo para 3; also see Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 814 (A) 835G. 
42  Prinsloo v Goldex para 23. 
43  Prinsloo v Goldex paras 24-25. 
44  Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd 1966 2 All ER 536 (HL). 
45  Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd 1966 2 All ER 536 (HL) 554G-H. 
46   Prinsloo v Goldex para 26. 
47  Royal Sechaba Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Coote 2014 5 SA 562 (SCA); Khumalo para 57. 
48  Royal Sechaba Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Coote 2014 5 SA 562 (SCA) paras 19-21. 
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there appears to be no reason why the two other requirements could be 
relaxed, but not the "same person"-requirement.49 
The Amicus contended that the common law should be developed so that 
issue estoppel can be applied in an instance where the parties are not the 
same.50 The court referred to Caesarstone Sdot-Yam Ltd v World of Marble 
and Granite 2000 CC.51 In that case, the Supreme Court of Appeal (per 
Wallis JA) remarked that whether Voet52 confined "same person" narrowly 
is unclear. In the court's view it would make no sense to allow someone who 
had been granted a fair opportunity already where a matter was litigated 
and decided to litigate de novo hoping for a different outcome based solely 
on the fact that there is some difference in the identity of the complainant.53 
Persuasive reasons must exist for the court to relax the "same person" 
requirement. Fairness and equity must dictate such relaxation. Res judicata 
has as its purpose to promote considerations favouring bringing litigation to 
finality and avoiding multiplicity in litigation resulting in conflicting judicial 
decisions on the same issue or issues.54  
Another argument that was raised in Khumalo favouring the relaxation of 
the res judicata rule was that allowing multiple complaints would defeat the 
purpose of the PEPUDA to resolve the dispute expeditiously.55 The court 
rejected this argument, noting that the requirement in regulation 10 that hate 
speech enquiries must be conducted speedily in an informal manner is 
contradicted by various provisions in the PEPUDA. Section 19 of the 
PEPUDA requires that hate speech proceedings must be heard in an open 
court and further requires adherence to some of the rules of the High Court 
or the magistrates’ court, which flies in the face of the stated purpose. 
Moreover, the pre-hearing formalities prescribed in the PEPUDA do not 
promote speedy finalisation.56  
                                            
49  Royal Sechaba Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Coote para 19. 
50  Khumalo para 58. 
51  Caesarstone Sdot-Yam Ltd v World of Marble and Granite 2000 CC 2013 6 SA 499 
(SCA) para 42. 
52  Voet in 44.2.7 in Commentary on the Pandects 560. 
53  Caesarstone Sdot-Yam Ltd v World of Marble and Granite 2000 CC 2013 6 SA 499 
(SCA) para 20. 
54  Caesarstone Sdot-Yam Ltd v World of Marble and Granite 2000 CC 2013 6 SA 499 
(SCA) para 21. 
55  Reg 10 in GN R764 in GG 25065 of 13 June 2003 proposes a procedure 
uncomplicated by legal technicalities in order to ensure the speedy resolution of 
disputes in the Equality Court. 
56  Khumalo para 61; see for instance AfriForum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) and 
South African Human Rights Commission obo South African Jewish Board of 
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The Amicus contended that the risk existed that the same issue might be 
decided differently by different courts, which is what the res judicata 
principle aims to prevent. The Amicus proceeded that if decided differently, 
the second proceedings would result in a contradiction between the findings 
of the two courts on the same facts. The court agreed that that risk indeed 
existed but remarked that that risk was overridden by other considerations.57 
It was argued on Khumalo's behalf that it would be an abuse of the court 
process to hear the second referral, as the two statements on which the 
claim was based were in fact one.58 The court agreed. However, the court 
noted that this being the case, the utterance should be considered 
holistically. That the second utterance was added in the second referral 
militated against relaxing the res judicata principle. The court viewed the 
two utterances as a continuous utterance which should be viewed as one. 
This had not been done in the Roodepoort proceedings.59 As the second 
part of the utterance had not been included in the original referral by the 
ANC, the matter, including this second part of the utterance, should be 
heard in the interest of justice.60  
It was argued further on Khumalo's behalf that he had been sanctioned 
already.61 The court did not feel that this enquiry – whether the sanction that 
Khumalo received extinguished the possible remedies – should form part of 
the assessment as to the judiciability of the second complaint. 
Notwithstanding, the court remarked that in the Roodepoort proceedings the 
court had not, as it ought to have done, considered all the possible 
remedies. The court felt that proper consideration would be required in any 
event to reach the conclusion that there was no further relief that could be 
ordered in respect of the second enquiry. This also supported the necessity 
of hearing the second dispute.62 Consequently, the court concluded that 
there would be no abuse of the process as envisaged by the PEPUDA.63  
The court also cited several other reasons why it would not be in the interest 
of justice to relax the principle of res judicata so as to disallow the second 
referral on these facts: there were several procedural deficiencies in the 
                                            
Deputies v Masuku 2018 3 SA 291 (GJ) which the court refers to as examples of 
how protracted these proceedings may become. 
57  Khumalo para 62. 
58  Khumalo para 65. 
59  Khumalo para 74. 
60  Khumalo para 66. 
61  Khumalo para 65. 
62  Khumalo para 66. 
63  Khumalo para 68. 
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Roodepoort proceedings which resulted in the case not being properly 
ventilated.64 As explained, the Roodepoort proceedings started off as an 
unfair discrimination case based on race, but somehow metamorphosed 
into a complaint of hate speech. The dispute had been dealt with as a 
"friendly" complaint, which the court held did not serve the public interest.65 
The matter was held in camera, but the record did not as is required in terms 
of the PEPUDA indicate any reason why it would be in the interest of justice 
to deal with the matter in this manner.66 The Johannesburg Equality Court 
held that the Roodepoort Equality Court had not as required in terms of 
section 21 of the PEPUDA held an "enquiry in the prescribed manner" in 
order to establish whether hate speech had taken place.67 In addition, as no 
enquiry had been held, the Roodepoort Equality Court had not been in any 
position to make an order. Absent a proper enquiry, it could not be said that 
the court had, as it was required to do, after due consideration decided on 
an appropriate order.68  
No evidence had been put forward.69 Without a substantive enquiry into the 
merits, it would be impossible for the court to exercise the discretion 
conferred to it to refer the matter for further criminal prosecution.70 There 
was no indication on the record of the Roodepoort Equality Court 
proceedings that pointed to the fact that the presiding officer had considered 
the aptness of the terms of the settlement agreement.71 Moreover, Khumalo 
had repudiated his admission that he was guilty of hate speech, which 
weighed in against upholding the plea of issue estoppel.72 Therefore, the 
court concluded that issue estoppel did not serve as a defence in this 
instance, and that it had the necessary jurisdiction to hear and decide on 
the matter.73  
5  Discussion 
5.1 Geographic or territorial jurisdiction of the Equality Court 
In Khumalo both of the courts – the Roodepoort Magistrates' Court sitting 
as the Equality Court and the Johannesburg High Court sitting as the 
                                            
64  Khumalo para 72. 
65  Khumalo paras 20 and 69. 
66  This is a contravention of s 19(2) of the PEPUDA. 
67  Khumalo para 24. 
68  Khumalo para 24.1. 
69  Khumalo para 24.3. 
70  Section 21(2)(n) of the PEPUDA. Khumalo para 24.1 
71  Khumalo para 24.3. 
72  Khumalo para 73. 
73  Khumalo para 75. 
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Equality Court – in principle had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.74 The 
Minister may in terms of the PEPUDA75 define, restrict or extend the area of 
jurisdiction of each Equality Court. But currently all of the magistrates' courts 
in the nine provinces of South Africa have been designated as equality courts 
by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.76 Particular 
magistrates or judges are appointed to preside in equality courts.77 But, 
despite the existence of regulations promulgated to regulate the area of 
jurisdiction in terms of section 2 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944,78 
problems are still encountered in practice.79 The problems enumerated by the 
court in Khumalo are the fact that there is no time limit for the referral of a 
hate speech complaint, and the absence of a registrar or administrator with 
capacity for the Equality Court.80 
In terms of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 "[e]xcept where it is 
otherwise by law provided, the area of jurisdiction of a court shall be the 
district, sub-district or area for which such a court is established."81 Despite 
being proclaimed, the areas of jurisdiction of the court are in a state of flux 
and uncertainty.82 To establish which court has jurisdiction is not a simple 
endeavour.83  
A potential problem that may arise in practice is a consequence of the fact 
that some equality courts appear to share geographical jurisdictions. There 
are currently 382 designated equality courts.84 In terms of section 16(1)(a) 
of the PEPUDA, the High Courts in the nine provinces are all equality courts 
                                            
74  Notably, the recent decision Nelson Mandela Foundation Trust and AfriForum 2019 
4 All SA 237 (EqC) was adjudicated under the auspices of the High Court and as the 
Equality Court in the same matter. The reason why the High Court enjoyed 
simultaneous jurisdiction with the Equality Court was because the constitutionality of 
s 10 of the PEPUDA had been questioned, which was not at issue in Khumalo.  
75  Section 16(1)(c) of the PEPUDA. 
76  "Designation of Magistrates' Courts as equality courts; defining the area of 
jurisdiction; and appointment of places for the holding of equality court sittings" - GN 
R859 in GG 32516 of 28 August 2009. See also GN 878 in GG 25091 of 13 June 
2013. 
77  See GN 878 in GG 25091 of 13 June 2003. Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 
Handbook 247-248. 
78  GN 878 in GG 25091 of 13 June 2013. There are for instance overlaps in the areas 
of jurisdiction of the Johannesburg Equality Court (which covers the whole of 
Johannesburg) and the Randburg Equality Court under which Roodepoort resorts 
(and also Krugersdorp, Oberholzer, Randburg, Randfontein and Westonaria). 
79  Khumalo para 118. 
80  Khumalo para 118. 
81  Section 26(1) in Part II of the Magistrates' Court Act 32 of 1944 dealing with civil 
matters. 
82  Harms Civil Procedure in Magistrates' Courts D26.6.  
83  See for instance R v Pretoria Timber Co (Pty) Ltd 1950 3 SA 163 (A). 
84   DoJ Date Unknown http://www.justice.gov.za/EQCact/eqc_courts.html. 
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for their jurisdictional area. The High Courts have jurisdiction to hear 
disputes in the defined provincial areas in which they are situated.85 Section 
6(3) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 mandates the Minister to 
establish areas of jurisdiction of the different provincial divisions. However, 
in areas where there is more than one seat in the province, the courts in 
terms enjoy concurrent jurisdiction.86 It is required that the Judge President 
must in courts having concurrent jurisdiction compile a single court role for 
the entire division.87 If a similar approach were to be followed in hate speech 
cases referred to the Equality Court, the problems related to the referral of 
different cases based on the same incident of hate speech should be 
addressed.  
Although the SAHRC has begun consolidating multiple complaints received 
in some cases, it has proven not to be very efficient. Several serious hate 
speech cases have apparently been left unattended, while others for 
reasons unbeknown to the authors have been pursued avidly.88 The 
SAHRC has also been subject to criticism regarding the uneven-handed 
way cases involving white as opposed to black perpetrators have been 
handled.89 If a formal directive were to be issued that all complaints are to 
be lodged with the SAHRC, and the SAHRC only consolidates the 
complaints instead of screening the cases, that might provide a solution. 
5.2  Jurisdiction of the SAHRC 
The SAHRC may in terms of its latest Complaints Handling Proceedings on 
own initiative or after receiving a complaint investigate any human rights 
violation.90 The SAHRC has discretion whether to investigate or not, but this 
determination must be made in a manner which is fair.91 It must provide 
                                            
85  Section 6 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. There are fourteen Provincial 
Divisions of the High Court: Eastern Cape: Bhisho, Grahamstown, Mthatha, Port 
Elizabeth; Free State: Bloemfontein; North Gauteng: Pretoria; South Gauteng: 
Johannesburg; KwaZulu-Natal: Durban, Pietermaritzburg; Limpopo: Thohoyandou; 
Northern Cape: Kimberley; North West: Mafikeng, Mmabatho; Polokwane Circuit 
Court of the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria and the Western Cape High Court: 
Cape Town. 
86  Section 6(4) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. 
87  Section 6(4)(c) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. 
88  Brink and Mulder 2017 https://solidariteit.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ 
Racism-hate-speech-and-double-standards-by-no-means-a-mere-matter-of-
bla....pdf. 
89  Bosman 2019 https://maroelamedia.co.za/debat/meningsvormers/menseregte 
kommissie-skeer-nie-almal-oor-dieselfde-kam/.  
90  Chapter 2 s 3(1) of SAHRC 2018 https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/ 
Complaints%20Handling%20Procedures%20-%20SAHRC%20-%20Public%20-
%201%20January%202018.pdf (the Complaints Handling Procedure). 
91  Chapter 2 s 3(2) of the Complaints Handling Procedure. 
J GELDENHUYS & M KELLY-LOUW  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  14 
reasons if it is unwilling or unable to entertain a dispute.92 One reason that 
is provided in section 3 itself is that the SAHRC may if a complaint is lodged 
longer than three years after the hate speech (or other human rights 
violation) had occurred decline to deal with the complaint.93 However, if 
subsequent to a preliminary investigation the SAHRC should find that there 
is merit in a complaint, it must do what it reasonably can to assist the 
complainant to secure redress.94 
The only expressed restriction on the jurisdiction of the SAHRC is in Chapter 
2 section 3(5) of the Complaints Handling Procedures, which determines 
that the SAHRC does not have jurisdiction to entertain complaints 
concerning human rights violations which occurred before 27 April 1994. 
However, whether a case based on hate speech can be pursued by lodging 
a complaint to the SAHRC only if the utterance was made in the Republic 
of South Africa is not clear. In a media report the Afrikanerbond indicated 
that it had referred a complaint to the SAHRC concerning racist remarks 
against whites that had been made by a previous South African Minister, 
Essop Pahad, during a visit to Beijing in China in August 2008.95 The 
SAHRC had declined to pursue that matter. At the time the SAHRC had 
reasoned that section 184(1)(c) of the Constitution requires it to "monitor 
and assess the observation of human rights in the Republic" and not 
infringements that took place outside of its borders.96 Apparently the 
Afrikanerbond had appealed against the decision of the SAHRC to no avail. 
The Afrikanerbond felt that the narrow interpretation that the SAHRC 
attributed to its mandate set an extremely dangerous precedent. In effect, 
they contended, the approach that had been adopted by the SAHRC meant 
that every South African could undermine the principles contained in the Bill 
of Rights if they were to do so outside of South Africa's borders. The 
Afrikanerbond argued that although the comments had been made outside 
                                            
92  Chapter 2 s 3(3) of the Complaints Handling Procedure. 
93  Chapter 2 s 3(6) of the Complaints Handling Procedure. 
94  Chapter 2 s 3(4) of the Complaints Handling Procedure. 
95  Minister Pahad had, during a press conference in Beijing, allegedly stated that "white 
South Africans would like to see the 2010 Soccer World Cup flop". The 
Afrikanerbond argued that even though the statement was limited to some white 
people only, it was "a form of irresponsible incitement and hate-speech" and that 
Pahad ought to have known better. See Staff Reporter 2008 
https://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-11-afrikanerbond-appeals-pahad-hate-speech-
decision. 
96  Kgosana 2019 https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/courts/2136394/human-rights-
commission-wants-catzavelos-in-equality-court-for-hate-speech/; Bosman 2019 
https://maroelamedia.co.za/debat/meningsvormers/menseregtekommissie-skeer-
nie-almal-oor-dieselfde-kam/. 
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of South Africa, the consequences of the Minister's utterances were felt in 
South Africa. In the result, it was contended that the utterance ought to fall 
within the ambit of the SAHRC's jurisdiction.97 
Recently, in the Catzavelos' case, the alleged perpetrator was on holiday in 
Greece when he made a racist utterance.98 However, the SAHRC argued 
that the video in which the utterance was recorded had also been posted on 
social media which were accessible to people in South Africa, rendering 
Catzavelos' conduct sanctionable in South Africa. Consequently, the 
SAHRC promptly lodged a complaint with the Equality Court on the basis of 
alleged hate speech.99 May one then assume that the SAHRC took heed of 
its responsibility to address hate speech that is perpetrated outside the 
borders of the Republic in instances where the effect of the utterance can 
be felt in South Africa? 
Another recent incident may provide some clarity. Zindzi Mandela-
Hlongwane, the daughter of the iconic late former President of South Africa, 
Nelson Mandela, and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, posted several 
seemingly demeaning tweets about white South Africans on her Twitter 
account during a land debate. Mandela-Hlongwane did so while she was 
the South African ambassador to Denmark. The utterances were made 
while she was in Norway in June 2019.100 An official complaint has been 
lodged with the SAHRC.101 The SAHRC has not dealt with the matter yet, 
but it did state on its official website that "the history of Zindzi Mandela and 
                                            
97  Staff Reporter 2008 https://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-11-afrikanerbond-appeals-
pahad-hate-speech-decision. 
98  He stated in the video: "Not a f***en [k-word] in sight. Heaven on earth". 
99  Mattushek 2019 https://www.sabreakingnews.co.za/2019/07/11/racist-catzavelos-
hit-with-r200k-fine-pleads-poverty/. Catzavelos has since reached a settlement 
agreement with the SAHRC on the hate speech charge. In terms of the agreement 
he has to pay R150 000 over a period of 30 months and had to issue an apology to 
the public for his comments. Lawrence Beeld 10. Notably, the political party, the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (the EFF) also instituted criminal charges based on 
crimen injuria against Catzavelos. Catzavelos pleaded guilty to the charges of 
crimen injuria in December 2019 and was sentenced on 28 February 2020 to pay an 
amount of R50 000 fine or face a suspended two-year jail term, both of which were 
suspended for five years. As the case has not been officially reported, we are reliant 
on media statements for information. See e.g. Anon 2020 
https://ewn.co.za/2020/02/13/adam-catzavelos-back-in-court-for-sentencing-over-
racist-comments; Citizen Reporter 2020 https://citizen.co.za/news/south-
africa/courts/2247974/im-grateful-for-judgment-and-ruling-adam-catzavelos-after-
getting-r50k-fine/. Apparently, he is also being prosecuted for hate speech in 
Greece, where the utterance was made.  
100  Maroela Redaksie 2019 https://maroelamedia.co.za/nuus/sa-nuus/eff-beaam-
zindzi-mandela-se-uitlatings/. 
101  Cornelissen 2019 https://maroelamedia.co.za/nuus/sa-nuus/klagte-teen-zindzi-
mandela-by-menseregtekommissie-ingedien/.  
J GELDENHUYS & M KELLY-LOUW  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  16 
her family needs to be taken into account during any investigation into her 
tweets on land reform."102 It will therefore be interesting to see how the 
SAHRC proceeds in this matter, in view of its expressed approach in the 
recent Catzavelos case.  
5.3  Monetary restrictions to the jurisdiction of the different equality 
courts 
As mentioned above, what relief is being claimed can also play a role in 
determining whether or not a court has jurisdiction.103 In a settlement 
agreement in Khumalo the SAHRC opted for an amount of R150 000 to be 
paid should Khumalo commit hate speech again within a 12-month 
period.104 The settlement was later aborted, and the SAHRC sought 
payment of that amount as compensation.105 The Johannesburg Equality 
Court linked the amount to the amount of R150 000 that the late Penny 
Sparrow had been required to pay106 shortly before the matter was heard. 
The court in Khumalo noted that Sparrow's personal financial circumstances 
had not been considered in arriving at R150 000. Khumalo likewise had not 
provided any information regarding his financial position.107 During the 
previous referral by the ANC to the Roodepoort Equality Court, Khumalo 
had indicated that he was not in a financial position to pay the R100 000 
that he was then asked to pay.108 In the end, an agreement had been 
reached between the ANC and Khumalo that Khumalo could pay a 
decreased amount of R30 000 in down-payments of R1000 per month to a 
charity organisation instead. In the subsequent proceedings in the 
                                            
102  SAHRC 2019 https://sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news/item/2030-sahrc-
will-consider-probe-into-zindzi-mandela-tweets. 
103  Estate Agents Board v Lek 1979 3 SA 1048 (A) 1063; Gulf Oil Corp v Rembrandt 
Fabrikante en Handelaars (Edms) Bpk 1963 2 SA 10 (T) 18. Also see Harms Civil 
Procedure in Magistrates' Courts D26.2 Part II-Civil Matters, Ch VI: Civil Jurisdiction. 
104  Khumalo para 5. 
105  Khumalo para 110. 
106  In 2016, Penny Sparrow, an estate agent, was found guilty of hate speech for posting 
the following in Facebook: "These monkeys that are allowed to be released on New 
years Eve [sic] and new years day [sic] on to [sic] the public beaches towns etc 
obviously have no education what so ever [sic] so to allow them loose is inviting huge 
dirt and discomfort to others. I'm sorry to say I was amongst the revellers and all I 
saw was black on black skins what a shame [sic]. I do know some wonderful 
thoughtful black people. This lot of monkeys just don't want to even try. But, think 
they can voice opinions about statute and get their way dear oh dear. From now on 
I shall address the blacks of South Africa as monkeys as I see the cute little wild 
monkeys do the same, pick and drop litter". Anon 2016 https://www.enca.com/south-
africa/penny-sparrow-feels-twitter-wrath. 
107  Khumalo para 111. The court remarked that the amount "has gained some sort of 
notorious default status". 
108  Khumalo para 22. 
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Johannesburg Equality Court, the court did not consider it appropriate to 
order him to pay an additional amount of compensation.109 The Equality 
Court in Khumalo held that imposing exorbitant amounts of monetary 
compensation to punish the respondent110 is not what the PEPUDA 
envisages. Considering the rehabilitation motive of the legislation, doing so 
would be counter-productive. Consequently, instead of the R150 000, the 
court ordered Khumalo to pay the SAHRC's costs,111 as the SAHRC is 
funded by the taxpayers.112 But is there a limitation on the amount that the 
Equality Court can order the perpetrator to pay? 
Magistrates' courts are divided into district and regional courts. Both may 
entertain civil cases and criminal cases. District Courts usually have a 
limitation on the quantum of damages that they can impose, which is 
currently set at R120 000. They can impose prison sentences not exceeding 
three years. The maximum fine amount in the Regional Court is now 
R600 000, and this court may hand down a maximum prison sentence of 
fifteen years. Different from the position in the ordinary Civil Courts, the 
magistrates' courts acting as equality courts have the same jurisdiction to 
make orders as the High Courts acting as equality courts.113 A magistrates' 
court is afforded additional powers to order a remedy exceeding the court's 
inherent jurisdiction in terms of section 21(2) of the PEPUDA provided that 
the High Court confirms the making of such a higher award. In terms of 
section 19(3)(a) of the PEPUDA, if a magistrate’s court makes an order 
exceeding its ordinary monetary jurisdiction, it must be confirmed by a High 
Court. Regulation 9 of the Regulations114 determines  
(1)  If a magistrates' court, sitting as a court, makes an order which exceeds 
the monetary jurisdiction of the said court, the clerk must within seven 
days after the order becomes available—  
                                            
109  Khumalo para 111. 
110  The payment of damages whether to the complainant or to a suitable organisation is 
but one of the wide range of remedies mandated in terms of s 21 of the PEPUDA. 
111  As to legal costs, the default position in the Equality Court appears that each party 
should pay its own costs in the Equality Court. Regulation 10 of GN R764 in GG 
25065 of 13 June 2003. Regulation 12 determines that there are no costs associated 
with the initiation of proceedings in the Equality Court. In so far as the costs of legal 
representation is concerned, each party is responsible for the payment of their own 
costs, save in instances where the presiding officer directs otherwise. 
112  Khumalo para 111. 
113  Kok 2008 SAJHR 451. 
114  GN R764 in GG 25065 of 13 June 2003. 
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(a)  inform the respondent that—  
(i)  the order is to be submitted to the High Court, for 
confirmation; and  
(ii)  he or she has the right to submit to the clerk any statement 
or argument within three days after receipt of the 
notification; and  
(b)  forward to the registrar of the High Court, the record of the 
proceedings or a copy thereof certified by the clerk, together with 
any statement or argument submitted by the respondent in terms 
of paragraph (a) (ii).  
(2)  The registrar must lay the record of the proceedings referred to in 
subregulation (1) before a judge of the High Court for confirmation.  
It is clear that there is no restriction on the compensation amounts that the 
Equality Court may order, whether it is a designated magistrates' court or a 
High Court. In practice it appears that many of the settlements that are 
reached by the SAHRC involve the payment of large amounts of money. 
For instance, the SAHRC proposed an amount of R200 000 to settle the 
Agrizzi hate speech matter out of court.115 Subsequently, the SAHRC in a 
newspaper article indicated that it sought at least R200 000 in damages116 
from Catzavelos, referred to above, for his alleged hate speech, even 
though he had made it clear that he could not afford to pay it.117 The 
amounts appear to be on the increase, and the SAHRC sees it as setting of 
a precedent for future cases. This goes against the purpose of the PEPUDA. 
Moreover, in the light of the progress that has been made in South Africa 
since 1995 to promote debtor protection,118 not factoring in whether the 
perpetrator is able to pay in deciding on a suitable sanction is unfathomable. 
In terms of the PEPUDA119 the Equality Court is provided with a wide 
                                            
115  Mattushek 2019 https://www.sabreakingnews.co.za/2019/07/11/racist-catzavelos-
hit-with-r200k-fine-pleads-poverty/. 
116  The Chairperson of the SAHRC in Gauteng, Buang Jones, indicated that the reason 
for setting the amount at R200 000 was that it could not accept a lesser amount due 
to the precedent which had been set in the Agrizzi-case and another case in Springs. 
Seleka Beeld 6. 
117  Nicodamus 2019 https://sadcnews.org/2019/07/11/adam-catzavelos-not-able-to-pay-sahrc-
r200-0000-fine/.  
118  See for instance the decision in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South 
Africa: Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1995 4 SA 631 (CC), in 
which the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional ss 65A-M of the PEPUDA 
for violating the right to personal freedom. In so doing, civil imprisonment for the 
inability to pay judgment debts was abolished. The enactment of the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005 and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 further bolsters the belief 
that the financial ability of the respondent in a hate speech case is an important factor 
to consider before an amount is decided upon.  
119  Section 21(2) of the PEPUDA. 
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discretion to correct the wrong. The aim is not to dish out a punishment, but 
rather to seek a remedy that will rectify the problem by rehabilitating the 
perpetrator. This is evident from the fact that the court can issue an interdict 
to prevent racism or require the utterer to make a public apology.120 This 
means that the compensation amount should be considered on a case-by-
case basis and that the financial circumstances of the perpetrator must be 
considered. 
Besides the financial circumstances of the respondent, another factor that 
should be considered in determining the quantum of damages is whether 
he or she is remorseful of the conduct. Given the remedial purpose of the 
wide range of interventions on offer in terms of the PEPUDA it would make 
sense that a genuine apology, whether in terms of the court order or 
otherwise, should impact favourably and the amount of damages ordered 
should decrease. On the flipside, where the court finds, as in Khumalo, that 
no genuine apology has been tendered, the amount should be higher.  
5.4 Appeals and reviews 
We agree that the victims in Khumalo deserved to have their case heard. 
However, the fact that there were many procedural irregularities in the 
Roodepoort proceedings in Khumalo would be grounds for review of the 
case. No review application was brought. That the court may have reached 
a different conclusion on the facts – since the court considered the utterance 
to be a single utterance – would be a ground for appeal. No appeal had 
been lodged in Khumalo. It does not appear to be the correct course of 
action for the court mero motu to address the apparent shortcomings in a 
second hearing. The reason for doing so in Khumalo appears to be the fact 
that, despite several proposals that would bring practical solutions to 
problems experienced in practice when applying the PEPUDA,121 nothing is 
being done to address the problems. The court comments that this case is 
a good example of how complaints can be referred by different persons 
aggrieved by hate speech to different equality courts. It would have been 
better, in the court's view, if the different complaints could be heard in a 
single hearing.122 Sutherland J laments the fact that the task of amending 
the PEPUDA has apparently been placed on the back burner, and that 
regulations could simply be promulgated to alleviate the glitches.123 Notably, 
                                            
120  Thabane and Rycroft 2008 ILJ 43, 46-47; also see Khumalo 2018 SA Merc LJ 393. 
121  See for instance Bohler-Muller and Tait 2000 Obiter; Kok 2008 SAJHR; Botha and 
Govindjee 2017 PELJ. 
122  Khumalo para 115. 
123  Khumalo paras 115-116. 
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the court invited the Minister of Justice to make submissions as to possible 
ways of addressing this problem. While recognising the existence of the 
problem, the Minister indicated that the Equality Review Committee was 
doing a comprehensive assessment of the PEPUDA, which would take 
some five years to complete. The Department of Justice would not respond 
before the assessment had been completed.124  
If one of the parties to a dispute under the PEPUDA is aggrieved by the 
outcome, it is possible to refer the matter for review or appeal.125 The appeal 
is made to the High Court or Supreme Court of Appeal having jurisdiction.126 
The High Court or Supreme Court of Appeal may subsequent to an appeal 
or review make any order that it deems fit. If the circumstances dictate, it is 
also possible to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court.127  
Regulation 19 of the Regulations Relating to the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination128 (the Regulations) in Chapter V 
entitled "Appeals and Review" prescribes the process to follow in appeals 
from the magistrates' court sitting as an Equality Court to the High Court or 
from the High Court to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The whole or only a 
part of the order may be the subject of an appeal.129 In terms of regulation 
19(7)(a) an appeal in the Equality Court must be handled like an appeal 
against a decision of a magistrate in a civil matter. The rules regulating the 
conduct of the proceedings of the several provincial and local divisions of 
                                            
124  Khumalo para 116. 
125  Section 23 of the PEPUDA. 
126  Section 23(1) of the PEPUDA. See, for instance, South African Human Rights 
Commission v Qwelane 2018 2 SA 149 (GJ). The South Gauteng High Court and 
the Johannesburg Equality Court found Qwelane, formerly an ambassador to 
Uganda, guilty of hate speech in 2017. This followed an article that he published in 
the Sunday Sun newspaper column on 20 July 2008 titled "Call me names - but gay 
is not okay''. The court found that his offending statements made in the column 
amounted to hate speech as contemplated in s 10(1) of the PEPUDA as it read at 
that time. On appeal, Qwelane succeeded in his application seeking to have s 10(1), 
read with ss 12 and 1, and s 11 of the PEPUDA declared unconstitutional for being 
inconsistent with s 16 of the Constitution (the freedom of expression provision). 
Mabuza 2018 https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-04-20-qwelane-
to-appeal-judgment-on-his-gay-bashing-column/; SABC Digital News 2019 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=65fHMgMB2C8. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Qwelane upheld the appeal and declared s 10 of the PEPUDA unconstitutional 
and invalid. The complaint lodged by the SAHRC against Qwelane was dismissed. 
Parliament was given a period of 18 months from 29 November 2019 to remedy the 
defect. S 10 has been reworded in the interim until Parliament amends the flaws. 
See fn 7 above. As already mentioned, it is not our intention here to discuss what 
would or could constitute "hate speech". 
127  Section 23(3) of the PEPUDA. 
128  N R764 in GG 25065 of 13 June 2003. 
129  Reg19(b), (d) of GN R764 in GG 25065 of 13 June 2003. 
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the High Court in so far as they relate to civil appeals from the magistrates' 
courts apply, with the necessary changes, to the appeal. On top of that, the 
uniform Rules of Court would apply with the necessary changes for 
purposes of an appeal.130 Regulation 20 sets out the procedure for the 
review of an order of the Equality Court. 
5.5 Hate speech inside or outside the workplace 
In Khumalo the offending utterance had been made via social media, 
outside of the workplace and not in the performance of Khumalo's duties. 
Would it have affected the judiciability of the dispute had the utterance been 
made by Khumalo in the work context? 
The provisions of the PEPUDA do not apply if the Employment Equity Act 
55 of 1998 (the EEA) applies.131 A dispute concerning alleged unfair 
discrimination must be referred to the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA) for conciliation within six months after 
the alleged discriminatory conduct.132 If attempts at conciliation fail, a claim 
for alleged unfair discrimination or harassment can be arbitrated by the 
CCMA provided that the employee earns below the threshold amount as 
stipulated in section 6(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 
1997 (the BCEA), or otherwise by the Labour Court.133 The wording of 
section 5(3) suggests that as soon as the EEA is applicable, the PEPUDA 
does not cover the case and the Equality Court would not have 
jurisdiction.134 
But the EEA does not include any protection against hate speech. The only 
provision that is related to making racial utterances is section 6 of the EEA. 
Section 6 of the EEA expressly provides that no person may unfairly 
discriminate, whether directly or indirectly, against an employee in any 
employment policy or practice, on any one or more of the grounds listed in 
the legislation.135 The section further prohibits unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of "race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family 
responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, 
language, birth or on any other arbitrary ground." Subsection 2 provides for 
                                            
130  Regulation 19(7)(b) of GN R764 in GG 25065 of 13 June 2003. 
131  Section 5(3) of the PEPUDA; also see Kok 2009 SA Public Law 651, 653. 
132  Section 10 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA); Basson et al New 
Essential Labour Law Handbook 253. 
133  Basson et al New Essential Labour Law Handbook 401. 
134  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 245 fn 182. 
135  Basson et al New Essential Labour Law Handbook 233. 
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two instances in which it will not constitute unfair discrimination on one of 
these grounds, namely if it is done in accordance with a valid employment 
equity (of affirmative action) plan, or if it is justifiable for reasons of an 
inherent requirement of the job. Section 6(3) of the EEA prohibits the 
harassment of an employee based on any or a combination of these listed 
grounds and extends the ambit of what qualifies as unfair discrimination also 
to include discrimination on unlisted grounds.136  
Although the definition of "employment policy or practice"137 as used in 
section 6 of the EEA is expressly stated not to be exhaustive, none of the 
items that are listed in the definition relates in any way to hate speech. Kok 
argues correctly that because the EEA does not include any reference to 
hate speech, all hate speech cases, whether perpetrated inside or outside 
of the workplace should be decided on by the Equality Court.138  
Given that it is inconceivable that the legislature intended to restrict rather 
than extend the net of protection against unfair discrimination, hate speech 
and harassment through the enactment of the PEPUDA,139 it is suggested 
that the application clause in the PEPUDA should be amended to read: "The 
PEPUDA does not apply to a person to whom the Employment Equity Act 
55 of 1998 applies to the extent to which that Act (the EEA) applies." This 
would mean that employees would be able to use the hate speech 
protection in the PEPUDA, which is not provided for in the EEA. 
5.6 The issue of different complainants and the potential open-
endedness of complaints 
In Khumalo, in deciding whether it should hear the second referral of the 
dispute, the court considered the status of the SAHRC as a complainant as 
opposed to the ANC. The SAHRC had acted on behalf of all white South 
                                            
136  See for instance Gumede and Crimson Clover 17 (Pty) Ltd t/a Island Hotel 2017 38 
ILJ 702 (CCMA) paras 22, 27 and 30 in which the employer's grounds for 
discriminating against the employee, i.e. that he was smelly and his clothes were 
dirty, were ruled to be irrational and unfair on arbitrary grounds. Botha 2018 THRHR 
674. 
137  Section 1 of the EEA defines the concept as follows: "'employment policy or practice' 
includes, but is not limited to– recruitment procedures, advertising and selection 
criteria; appointments and the appointment process; job classification and grading; 
remuneration, employment benefits and terms and conditions of employment; job 
assignments; the working environment and facilities; training and development; 
performance evaluation systems; promotion; transfer; demotion; disciplinary 
measures other than dismissal; and dismissal." 
138  Kok 2009 SA Public Law 654. 
139  The PEPUDA extends the protection provided under the Constitution against unfair 
discrimination. Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 244-245. 
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Africans and the South African Jewish community. The ANC represented its 
white members only. Much of the decision regarding whether the second 
referral should be entertained revolved around the question of whether the 
referral was made by the "same person".  
Section 20 of the PEPUDA regulates the legal standing of persons, groups, 
associations or institutions in the Equality Court. A complainant may act in 
his own interest, or on behalf of someone else who is unable to act on his 
own. A complaint may also be lodged on behalf of a particular group or class 
of persons or an association. Moreover, complaints may be lodged by the 
SAHRC and the Commission for Gender Equality. 
This provision leaves the door wide open for the referral of multiple hate 
speech complaints by different parties based on the same utterance. A 
troubling admission that is made in Khumalo is that this would be the case 
subject to the restrictions in the Prescription Act 68 of 1969.140 The 
Prescription Act's provisions restrict the right in section 34 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 to litigate a matter after a 
period of three years from the act or omission that gave rise to the action.141 
This corresponds with the time limit in section 3(6) of Chapter 2 of the 
SAHRC's Complaints Handling Procedures,142 which reads:  
The Commission may decline to investigate a complaint where the alleged 
violation occurred more than 3 years prior to the lodging of the complaint with 
the Commission. In instances where a complaint is rejected on this ground, 
the Commission will provide the complainant with written reasons for its 
decision. 
We agree with the court that the PEPUDA is a civil statute which provides 
civil remedies.143 Double jeopardy, which is applicable in criminal cases 
only, would consequently never apply to instances where the court must 
consider whether or not a second referral should be entertained. However, 
to allow different complainants to approach the court for a period of 
(probably) three years to argue as to whether the circumstances could fall 
in the confines of the res judicata principle or of its relaxed nephew, issue 
estoppel, to be decided on a case-by-case is equally untenable. 
In conducting of its own investigations the SAHRC appears not to be 
effective. In particular, the SAHRC is not efficient in the screening of hate 
                                            
140  Khumalo para 60. 
141  Sections 10(1), 11 and 12 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969; also see Road Accident 
Fund v Mdeyide 2011 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 10. 
142  Chapter 2 s 3(6) of the Complaints Handling Procedures. 
143  Khumalo para 87. 
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speech cases. In several cases they ascribe the delays in acting against 
alleged perpetrators of hate speech to the fact that they must consolidate 
the complaints lodged by victims.144 We propose that instead of taking on 
the responsibility of screening cases, the SAHRC should become the 
administrative body that accepts pleadings in all cases related to alleged 
hate speech.145 The SAHRC could in the mainstream media publish legal 
notices of hate speech cases accepted by it, to notify the public. This would 
accord with the acknowledgment in the PEPUDA that hate speech has a 
public interest dimension.146 Instead of the situation presently prevailing, 
where these pending cases are reported upon in the newspapers and in 
social media, the SAHRC should on their official website147 inform the public 
of the details of the cases and invite the public to lodge complaints. Doing 
so would address the skewed reporting of only certain hate speech cases 
in the quest for sensation148 and promote accuracy in the reporting of these 
matters. Allowing members of the public access to the correct information 
and to lodge their own complaints would also promote the right to access to 
justice as envisaged in the Constitution.149 
Time limits must be set for the lodging of complaints. The time period for the 
referral of an unfair discrimination case in terms of the EEA,150 i.e. six 
months from the date of the alleged hate speech, may serve as a guideline, 
although it might be too short, considering that hate speech cases involve 
groups of victims and not individual litigants.151 We suggest that one year 
would be a reasonable time for the lodging of hate speech complaints in 
terms of the PEPUDA.152 Thereafter, the SAHRC should consolidate the 
                                            
144  See the discussions of Khumalo, Sparrow and ex-President Zuma. Brink and Mulder 
2017 https://solidariteit.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Racism-hate-speech-
and-double-standards-by-no-means-a-mere-matter-of-bla....pdf. 
145  For a discussion of the various functions of the human rights commissions in different 
jurisdictions see Geldenhuys 2019 TSAR 659-665. 
146  Section 19(2) of the PEPUDA requires that hearings in hate speech matters must be 
held in public. 
147  See SAHRC 2020 https://www.sahrc.org.za/. This would conform with the SAHRC 
Complaint Handling Procedures Ch 1 s 1(1), which determines that "[t]he South 
African Human Rights Commission (the SAHRC/Commission) must make known 
publicly the particulars of the procedure to be followed in conducting an investigation 
of any alleged violation of human rights." 
148  The research conducted by Brink and Mulder suggests that media reporting of hate 
speech complaints is often skewed along racial lines. See Brink and Mulder 2017 
https://solidariteit.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Racism-hate-speech-and-
double-standards-by-no-means-a-mere-matter-of-bla....pdf. 
149  Section 34 of the Constitution. 
150  Chapter 2 s 10 of the EEA. 
151  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 17. 
152  The possibility of bringing an application for condonation should not be excluded. 
This could be introduced by means of an appropriate adaptation of Ch 2 s 8 of the 
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complaints and refer the cases with the complainants properly consolidated 
to the relevant Equality Court. Should the SAHRC provide reasons within its 
discretion for declining to refer the dispute based on hate speech to the 
Equality Court, a petition procedure should be available to complainants.153  
6 Conclusion 
The jurisdiction of different equality courts is wrapped in uncertainty. It 
appears that there are designated equality courts with overlapping 
jurisdictional territories, leading to concurrent jurisdiction.  
Whereas the SAHRC has on an informal and rather ad-hoc basis apparently 
taken on the role of consolidating disputes involving alleged hate speech, it 
has not been appointed formally to do so. Moreover, there is no 
administrative body in South Africa that is currently responsible for 
accepting hate speech complaints and advising the public of their existence 
or of the details. 
No monetary restrictions are placed on the jurisdiction of the designated 
equality courts, whether they are magistrates' courts or Higher Courts. 
Considering the rehabilitative purpose of the PEPUDA, the amount of 
compensation should be decided on a case-by-case basis, considering the 
financial circumstances of the perpetrator. The amounts used in settlements 
should not be set as precedents and used indiscriminately in future cases. 
Other factors, such as the financial ability of the respondent in a hate speech 
case, and whether in the court's view he or she has shown remorse for the 
hate speech, should be taken into account to avoid the levying of exorbitant 
compensation amounts, which is contrary to the laudable aims of the 
PEPUDA.  
Instead of shirking the procedures that are prescribed for reviews and 
appeals, the problems that have been identified must be addressed. To 
remove the uncertainty regarding whether hate speech perpetrated in the 
work context is judiciable, we recommend an amendment of section 5(3) of 
the PEPUDA. Instead of perpetuating the problem relating to multiple 
complaints being referred by different complainants to different equality 
                                            
Complaints Handling Procedures, which provides the procedure for the condonation 
of the late lodging of a complaint with the SAHRC, i.e. after the 3-year period 
following the human rights violation has elapsed. 
153  This could be fashioned to Rule 4 of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of 
Proceedings in the Labour Appeal Court (GN 1666 in GG 17495 of 14 October 1996) 
as amended. 
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Courts for what seems to be at least three years or potentially a longer 
period, we proffer several suggestions: 
(a) The SAHRC should formally be appointed as the central registry to 
accept all hate speech complaints by directive. 
(b) The SAHRC should inform the public of all complaints received in legal 
notices in mainstream newspapers and issue formal statements on 
their official website to provide accurate facts concerning the 
complaints. The public should be invited to lodge complaints related to 
the referrals. 
(c) A clear time limit should be set for the lodging of complaints.  
(d) The SAHRC should refer complaints properly consolidated to the 
Equality Court; and 
(e) A petition procedure should be introduced for instances where the 
SAHRC declines to refer a hate speech case to the Equality Court.  
All victims of alleged hate speech deserve their day in court. However, the 
Equality Court cannot deviate from the procedures that are prescribed for 
the review and appeal of judgments. As they say, two (or in this case many) 
wrongs do not make a right. 
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